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THE CONSTRUCTION OF ORIGINAL
PUBLIC MEANING
Jack M. Balkin*
I. A THEORETICAL PUZZLE-AND SIX SOLUTIONS

In January of 2014, lawyers assembled at the Supreme Court
to argue NLRB v. Noel Canning. One of the questions before the
Justices was whether the President could only make recess
appointments between official sessions of the Senate (intersession recesses), or could also make appointments within an
official session when the Senate had adjourned for some
substantial period of time (intra-session recesses).
As the case moved through the courts, lawyers debated the
original meaning of Article II, Section 2, Clause 3, which gives the
President power "to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during
the Recess of the Senate." 2 Did "the Recess" refer to the single
recess between official sessions, or did it refer to any extended
period of time in which the Senate was not sitting? Because
transportation between home states and Washington D.C. was
quite difficult for many Senators in the early Republic, the Senate
did not take any significant intra-session recesses-other than for
the period between Christmas and the beginning of Januaryuntil after the Civil War. 3 Therefore the meaning of its early
practice was ambiguous. "[T]he Recess" could refer to a single
event that occurred only between official sessions, as Justice
1

* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law
School. My thanks to Saul Cornell, Jill Hasday, and Sanford Levinson for their comments
on previous drafts.
I. 1.34 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II,* 2, cl. 3.
3. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2652 ("In 1X67 and 1X6X, Congress for the first
time took suhstantial, nonholiday intra-session hreaks, and President Andrew Johnson
made dozens of recess appointments."); id. at 257lJ (chart of congressional intra-session
recesses).
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Scalia insisted, 4 or it could refer to an instance of a larger class of
similar things or events, as in the sentence "the elephant is the
largest land mammal.""
Suppose, however, that just before the oral argument, it had
been discovered that multiple versions of the Constitution had
been distributed in September 1787 in states whose assent was
crucial to its eventual adoption- for example, Pennsylvania.
Some of these texts said, ''during the Recess of the Senate." Other
texts said "while the Senate is not sitting." Amazingly, however,
no one noticed the discrepancy during the ratification debates,
and the Constitution was eventually adopted.
If this had happened, what would be the original public
meaning of Article II, Section 2, Clause 3? Would it be "during
the Recess of the Senate," which could-but need not-confine
recess appointments to those made between official sessions? Or
would it be "while the Senate is not sitting," which could- but
need not-empower the President to make intra-session
appointments? Or would we conclude that, at least as to this
question, there was no single original public meaning? In that
case, we would simply note that the participants took different
public meanings from the different versions of the text they read,
and we would have to rely on other resources to implement the
Constitution.
Remarkable as it may sound, something like this actually
happened. Christina Mulligan, Michael Douma, l-Ians Lind and
Brian Quinn (hereinafter MDL&Q) have pointed out that in
1787, the population of Pennsylvania was about a third Germanspeaking/ and a significant percentage of New Yorkers spoke
Dutch, "especially in the rural areas around New York City." 7 As
a result, MDL&Q explain, in late September 1787, a week after
the English version was submitted to the states for ratification, the
Pennsylvania Assembly commissioned a German translation for
the state's German speakers. It sent out 3,000 English copies and

4. !d. at 25tJ5-<Jh (Scalia, L dissenting).
5. See id. at 25fll (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,* 3, cl. 5) (noting that "The Constitution,
for example, directs the Senate to choose a President pro tempore 'in the Ahscncc of the
Vice-President."' (emphasis added)).
h. Christina Mulligan, Michael Douma, Hans Lind and Brian Ouinn, Founding l:"ra
Translations of the Constitution, .11 CONST. COMM. I, 4 (201(1) !Hereinafter MDL&O,
Founding fo"ra Translations 1.
7.
/d.
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1,500 German copies "to be distributed throughout th[ e] state for
the inhabitants thereof."x Pro-ratification forces in New York
9
commissioned a Dutch translation in 1788, "presumably printed
before voting for convention delegates began on April29." 10
The German version of Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 reads
"da der Senat nicht sitzt;" that is, "when the Senate is not sitting,"
while the Dutch version reads "gedurende de afweezenthyd van
de Senaat," or "during the extended absence of the Senate."'' The
German version, and to a lesser extent, the Dutch version, seem
compatible with recess appointments when the Senate is
adjourned during an official session, if the absence is sufficiently
substantial.
Although Pennsylvania and New York were only two of the
original thirteen ratifiers of the Constitution, Pennsylvania's early
ratification on December 12, 1787, was widely acknowledged to
be crucial to the success of the enterprise. New York ratified on
July 26, 1788, shortly after the ninth state, New Hampshire, on
June 21st, 1788, and the tenth state, Virginia, on June 25th, 1788.
Hence, under Article VII, the Constitution was already
guaranteed to come into operation even without New York's
assent. Nevertheless, its acceptance was also crucial as a practical
matter. Without ratification by New York, then as now a key
commercial center of the nation, and situated strategically
between New England and the rest of the country, the new union
of states would likely flounder.
For these reasons, the understanding of a significant
proportion of the ratifying public in both states cannot easily be
disregarded.
If one is a conscientious originalist, and believes that
constitutional interpretation should begin with ascertaining the
original public meaning of the text, what is to be done? There are
a number of possible solutions.
First, we might concede that, as to this particular question,
there is no original public meaning of Article II, Section 2, Clause
3. More than one version of the text circulated among the ratifying
public; and the people whose assent was necessary for ratification
X.
Y.
10.
II.

!d. at 3.
/d. at 4.
/d. at Y.
!d. at 43.
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in key states were working with different texts. This argument is
based on a theory of popular sovereignty. What makes the
Constitution law is the consent of the ratifying public- We the
People-who give assent to the text presented to them. Because
different members of the public read different texts, when the
texts differ significantly with respect to a particular question,
there is no single original public meaning. Therefore a court today
should treat the text as irreducibly ambiguous as to this particular
question and turn to constitutional construction~ resolving the
controversy based on other modalities of constitutional argument,
including precedent, inter-branch convention, structure, and
consequences. This is perhaps closest to what the majority
actually did in Noel Canning; it argued that the English text was
ambiguous and then resolved the case based on other
considerations.'-'
Second, we might draw on analogies to countries that have
more than one official language in which laws and judicial
opinions are written, or to treaties between countries written in
multiple languages. Accordingly, we might compare the English,
German, and Dutch versions to see if they shed light on the
underlying goals of the law, with the hopes of producing a single
compromise version that we will henceforth treat as the original
public meaning. 13 This approach treats the German and Dutch
versions as co-equal with the English printed version, at least in
Pennsylvania and New York, even though they were not officially
enrolled as part of U.S. law. The justification for this approach
would also be a theory of popular sovereignty. Significant parts of
We the People in crucial states voted for adoption the
Constitution based on these versions. These versions are part of
the ground of authority for making the Constitution law. Hence
we must consider all of them in determining the original public
12. See NLRB v. Nod Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 25ol (2014).
ll. See Nial Fennelly, !~ega/ Interpretation at the fc'uropean C'ourt of Justice, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 65o, o5o, o04-o5 ( 19Y7) (noting that given multiple official languages,
courts tend to focus on the underlying purposc of a statute); Lawn.:ncc M. Solan, The
Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes by the f~uropean Court of Justice, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 277, 27!) (200<J) (arguing that hccause "the goal of the court is to construc statutes to
effectuate the intcnt of thc lcgislature and to further the goals of thc ,_:nacted directive or
regulation, the existence of so many versions of the law makes this task easier .... ITihe
Bahel of Europe facilitates communication."); see also MDL&.Q, Founding f-'ra
Translations, supra notc o, at lo (arguing that multiple translations of the Constitution
offer "ltjhe same potential to 'triangulate'" and therefore provide an opportunity to
"clarify rather than muddy the document's meaning").
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meaning.
Third, we might simply ignore any differences between the
texts and focus solely on the English version because most
speakers who participated in the ratification debates were English
speakers, because the German and Dutch versions affected the
ratification of only two states out of thirteen, and because the
Philadelphia Convention does not appear to have specifically
authorized or produced any official translations when it
distributed the proposed Constitution to the states.
To be sure, the German text was commissioned by the
14
Pennsylvania Assembly. If the procedural niceties of ratification
were left up to individual states, the German text might arguably
qualify as an official version within Pennsylvania. The New York
translation, however, was commissioned by proponents of
ratification, rather than by the New York Legislature. 15 In any
case, we might justify looking only to the English version based
on the need to converge on a single official text, and the fact that
thirteen states eventually ratified, far more than the nine required
by Article VII.
Fourth, we might use the German and Dutch translations as
evidence of or as a commentary on what the real or official textthat is, the English text-meant at the time to English speakers.
This is closest to MDL&Q's general approach. They treat the
English text as the sole official text of the law and view the
German and Dutch translations as commentaries on the real
16
Constitution- the printed English version. This approach makes
these versions, in theory, no different than a particularly
comprehensive pamphlet or newspaper article on what the
17
proposed constitution said. Indeed, it puts the translations on the
same footing as the celebrated commentaries in The Federalist,
which paraphrased and expounded the Constitution's meaning to
New Yorkers. It follows then, that the situation of German and
Dutch speakers who read only the translated versions are like the

14. MDL&O, Founding E'ra Translations, supra note 6, at 3.
15. !d. at 4.
16. See id. at 10 (treating the translations as commentaries and "the considered
analyses or intelligent observers"); id. at 13 ("[T[hc translations constitute, therefore,
commentaries or 'considered analyses' -an additional source to access the original puhlic
meaning or the Constitution as translated in the late 17XOs.") (emphasis added).
17. See id. at 15 (arguing that translations arc even hctter than most commentaries
in that "these translations arc hath contextual and comprehensive").
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situation of English speakers who never actually read the text but
who supported or opposed the Constitution based on what they
heard from their neighbors or read in the newspapers.
To the extent that the German and Dutch translations are
incorrect, or misguided, those commentaries are simply
mistakes. 1x Along the same lines, on some issues even The
Federalist itself may be mistaken, although because it has amassed
such symbolic and cultural authority over the years, many people
may be loath to disregard it. Perhaps if the Gerrnan and Dutch
translations had become more widely known and celebrated (or if
substantial numbers of Americans spoke German and Dutch
today), their authority as commentaries might also be enhanced.
Indeed, one possible result of MDL&Q's article is that people will
pay more attention to these founding-era translations in the
future.
Fifth, we might argue, by analogy to the enrollled bill rule for
legislation, Jl) that the only text that matters is the official text that
became part of U.S. law. That version was based on the
September 28, 1787 version printed in English, itself a reprint of a
20
September 18, 1787 printed version. In fact, that official printed
version differs in slight ways (in matters of capitalization and
21
punctuation) from the engrossed parchment version actually

IX. See id. (noting that the translations contain ''clear mistakes" and "more suhtle
errors" in relation to the English text, which is the standard of authori,ty).
llJ. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 64lJ, o72 (IXlJ2) ("The signing hy the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and hy the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled hill, is an official attestation hy the two houses of such hill as one that has passed
Congress," and "when a hill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the
puhlic archives, its authentication as a hill that has passed Congres~~ should he deemed
complete and unimpeachable.").
20. Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, l)7
YALE L.J. 2XI, 2X3-X4, 2lJX (llJX7); seeS. Doc. No. X7-4lJ, at 4lJ, 52, 55-5o, f,l) (1%1)
(presenting detailed historical notes regarding the text of the Constitution hy Denys P.
Myers).
21. See Amar, supra note 20, at 2l)J, 2%-lJ7. For example, there is one ohvious typo
in the Septemher 2Xth print. Its version of Article III, Section I, Clause 2 states that "The
judges, hoth of the supreme and inferior court, shall hold their offices during good
hehaviour." See S. Doc. No. X7-4lJ, at 13 (emphasis added). In the Septemher 17th
parchment copy, Article III, Section I, Clause 2 states that "The Judges, hoth of the
supreme and inferior C'ourts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour." See "S. Doc.
No. lJ2-X2, at 5X3 ( Jl)72). Given that in the previous sentence the printed version speaks of
"such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," the text
is an ohvious misprint. I do not hclieve that one can reasonahly read the text to suggest
that Congress has the power to create only one inferior court, or that the judges of only
one court hold their offices during good hehavior. But legal hattles have heen waged over
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signed by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia, which is currently on display in the National
Archives. 22
According to this view, original meaning originalism actually
rejects the conception of popular sovereignty I described earlier.
It is not concerned with people's actual understandings of the text
they actually voted on. Rather, it is concerned only with the
understanding that a hypothetical reasonably informed speaker of
the language in which the official law was composed would have
of the official version ultimately enrolled. The relevant language
is therefore English, and so we are only interested in what
reasonably informed ordinary speakers of English at the time
understood the official text to say. When we say that the text is
made law by an act of popular sovereignty, we are really ascribing
the authority of We the People to this hypothetical understanding
of the text by a hypothetical person.
It follows, then, that the views of German and Dutch
speakers are irrelevant except to the extent that they were also
part of the community of English speakers at the time and would
have influenced our judgment about what a reasonably informed
speaker of English would have understood the official text to
mean. Moreover, to the extent that English was their second
language, the views of German and Dutch speakers were
somewhat less relevant to this hypothetical judgment than the
views of native speakers who were, presumably, fluent and fully
competent.
Sixth, we might argue that the original meaning of the text is
the meaning that well-trained lawyers, using the interpretive
methods generally employed at the time of adoption, would have
gleaned from the official text. This approach, called "original

far less.
22. Ironically, although the Septemher 2~th version was the official enrolled text, it
is not the official text today. No master copy of the Septemher 2~th printed version was
preserved, and as the text was reprinted numerous times, additional errors crept in. SeeS.
Doc. No. ~7-49, at 49, hO; Amar, supra note 20, at 2~4. As a result, when Congress sought
a corrected copy, it turned to the signed parchment manuscript, which was not, in fact, the
official copy. Since 1~7~, the parchment copy has heen treated as the official copy, and a
version of its text now appears in the House and Senate Manuals and the ll.S. Code. See
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND
AMENDMENTS, lJ.S.C. (2012); S. Doc. No. ~7-49, at 49, 54, 41-92; Amar, supra note 20, at
2~5. Thus, even the "official" English language version of the Constitution has mutated a
hit over time.
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methods," has been championed by John McGinnis and Michael
Rappaport. n The legal understandings of ordinary individuals are
not part of the original public meaning except to the extent that
they would be incorporated into the views of well-trained lawyers
using original legal methods. Therefore the understandings of
German and Dutch speakers who read the Constitution in
translation, are, for the most part, irrelevant to the original public
meaning. Only the views of German and Dutch speakers who
were also well-trained lawyers would be relevant, and only to the
extent that they, as well-trained lawyers, had opinions about the
English text that became law.
II. ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING AS A THEORETICAL
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PAST
All of these six solutions have points in their favor. And there
are probably other solutions one could imagine that I have not
mentioned here.
But my purpose in listing these possible approaches is not to
arbitrate among them. My goal is to point out that, whichever
solution we adopt, the "original public meaning'' that emerges is
a theoretical construction. It selects certain features of the past as
relevant, and renders other features of the past irrelevant. It reconfigures the features of the past it selects as relevant through
the perspective of a theory of law. It then dubs that
reconfiguration ''the original public meaning of the text," and it
does so because of theoretical and practical commitments in the
present.
No matter which of the above six approaches we choose-or
indeed, any other- the original public meaning of Article II,
Section 2, Clause 3 is not a simple fact of the matter that existed
on a particular day in 1787. Rather, it is a constructed entity that
is shaped by our present-day need to understand the Constitution
and to resolve present-day controversies. To be sure, that
constructed entity hopefully rests on facts that we know or believe
to be true. Moreover, it can be challenged and altered if some of
the relevant facts that it assumes to be true are not actually true.
But articulating the original public meaning is not a simple job of
reporting what happened at a certain magical moment in time. It
23. See JOliN 0. MCGINNIS & MICIIAEL RAPPAPORT, 0RIGINALISM AND THE
( IOOD CONSTITUTION 14, 116-17 (2(}] 3 ).
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is a theoretical and selective reconstruction of elements of the
past, brought to the present and employed in the present for
present-day purposes. Each of the solutions that I have presented
does this, but does so in a different way, and based on a different
legal theory.
MDL&Q's article shows why that must be the case when we
face multiple versions of a text distributed to the ratifying public.
But the same point applies even if there had been only one text,
in English, and there had never been any other versions
distributed to the public, in English or in any other language. That
is because, even with only one text, there are almost certain to be
multiple understandings of the meaning of that text among the
ratifying public. In a political process like the ratification of a
constitution, different people will take away different things even
from the same document.
This feature of legal texts was as true in 1787 as it is in our
own day. Think only, for example, about the vehement
disagreements about the meaning of "an Exchange established by
the State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act" 24 that led to the litigation in King v.
25
Burwell. The law in question had been passed only five years
previously, and yet people held diametrically opposed views
about what the language of the statute actually said. Indeed, some
participants in the debate insisted that if their view was not
26
vindicated, "[w]ords no longer have meaning."
To be sure, those disagreements were no doubt enhanced by
the ideological controversies of our day. But the period of
ratification was filled with ideological disagreements every bit as
fierce as those of the present. The notion that the late 1780s were
a period of placid consensus about the meaning of words in legal
texts, about the political principles behind them, or about their
proper application to real-world controversies, is more than
27
naive- it is simply ridiculous.

24. 26 U.S.C. ~ 36B(h)(2)(A) (2012).
25. 135 S. Ct. 24XO (2015).
26. See id. at 2497 (Scalia, J ., dissenting).
27. See Jack N. Rakovc, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty
of Public Meaning Originalism, 4X SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 5XX (2011) ("It is one thing,
after all, to suppose that words fraught with political content retain a relatively fixed
meaning in 4uiet times, hut it is 4uite another to apply that assumption to a period like the
late 17XOs or the Revolutionary era more generally."); id. at 593 ("The adopters of the
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Thus, if our account of original public meaning is at all
sensitive to the actual understandings of actual people living at
the time of adoption, it will pick up these disagreements about
meaning, and it will have to decide what to do with them. One way
we might deal with this problem is to pick a version of original
public meaning that is the least sensitive to these differences in
understanding, and that focuses as much as possible on areas of
likely and overwhelming agreement. That is why, for example, I
have argued for a relatively "thin" theory of original public
meaning- essentially confined to the original serrtantic meaning
of the words, but taking into account any generally recognized
terms of art, and any background context necessary to understand
the text. ~
What a thin theory excludes from original public meaning is
the original expected application of the text- how people at the
time of adoption would have expected that the text would be
applied to concrete situations, as well as the way that members of
the adopting generation would have expected the relevant
constitutional principles and justifications would be articulated
and applied. These aspects of meaning are precisely the ones that
would most likely generate differences of op1mon among the
ratifying public.
These features of the past remain fully relevant for
constitutional construction. The point of the thin theory is that
they are not binding on us today in the way that the (thin version
of) original public meaning is binding. It follows that the original
public meaning, by itself, will significantly underdetern1ine how to
apply the Constitution. Lawyers and judges must also build out
2

Constitution inhahitcd a world that was actively concerned with ... the instahility of
linguistic meanings, and ... arguments ahout the definitions of key words and concepts
were themselves central clements of political dchatc."); see also Saul Cornell, Conflict,
Consensus & Constitlllional Meaning: The Enduring l"egacy of Charles Beard, 2l) CONST.
COMMENT. 3X3, 405 (2014) ("Given the contentious nature of Founding era legal culture
it seems unrcasonahle to assume that one can identify a single set of assumptions and
practices from which to construct an ideal rcasonahlc reader who could serve as model for
how to understand the Constitution in 17XX.").
2X. See Jack M. Balkin, Must We Be Faithful to Original Meaning?, 7 JERUSALEM
REV. LFCiAL Snm. 57, 70, 77 (2013) jhcrcinaftcr Must We Be Faithful to Original
Meaning?j; Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of 1/istory, X2 FORDHAM
L. REV. 641, 646 (2013). The semantic meaning of a word or phrase is its dictionary
definition or to definitions that arc in common usc among the population; hence "original
semantic meaning" refers to dictionary definitions or to definitions in common usc at the
time of adoption.
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doctrines and institutions on top of the basic framework of the
Constitution's original public meaning.
My theory of constitutional interpretation thus distinguishes
between the task of constitutional interpretation- ascertaining
original public meaning- and constitutional constructionbuilding doctrines and institutions that give effect to the
29
Constitution's provisions. Most of what we call constitutional
interpretation is actually constitutional construction.
It should be obvious that the thin theory of original meaning
is not the only possible version. Like every other lawyers' theory
of original public meaning, the thin theory is a choice, not a
description. It focuses on only certain features of the past and
declares them, and not others, as binding in the present, leaving
other features of the past as a resource for constitutional
construction.
A thin theory of original public meaning is not unique in this
regard. All theories of original public meaning must do this to one
degree or another; they simply do it in different ways with
different theoretical justifications for their approach. Not
surprisingly, disputes about original public meaning are usually
more than simple disputes about facts; they are also usually
disputes about theories and normative assumptions.
MDL&Q's study is valuable precisely because it makes clear
what is always at work in original public meaning originalism.
Faced with multiple translations of Article I I, Section 2, Clause 3,
we must view history through the prism of legal theory and
practical considerations to arrive at the original public meaning.
This seems obvious to us because the situation they describe is so
unexpected and unusual; but we must do so even in the standard
case. Through their work on Founding-era translations, MDL&Q
have revealed to us more clearly the problem that occurs
whenever we impose the requirements of legal theory and legal
justification on the messy facts of history.
We originalists may like to assert-perhaps as a convenient
shorthand-that in our search for original public meaning, we are
simply reporting objectively and dispassionately on the facts of
the past. 30 Objectivity and dispassion are important virtues in
2lJ.

See

JACK

M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4-5 (2011) !hereinafter LIVING

ORIGINALISMI.

30.

See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, X2
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historical investigation, and we should embrace them. But
inquiries into original public meaning do much more. The choice
of which facts are relevant and important, and how and why they
are relevant and important, are shaped by our theoretical and
practical commitments. Those commitments prefigure what we
look for in the past, how we evaluate what we find, what we
discard as peripheral or not germane, and what we will do with
the evidence that we bring forward with us into the present.
Theories of original public meaning- for there are more than
one- produce carefully constructed configurations of the past
that serve theoretical and practical values of the present. And
there is nothing wrong with that, as long as we are candid about
those values, and willing to defend them openly.
We can see this most clearly in a frequently quoted test of
original public meaning-what a hypothetical speaker of the
English language at the time of adoption would understand the
31
officially adopted text to mean. Under this approach, the actual
views of actual speakers of the English language, (and the actual
text that they might have confronted) are evidence of this
hypothetical speaker's views, but they are not conclusive. We
must sift through history to imagine and construct what this
hypothetical speaker of English would have thought. We must
filter historical evidence through the sieve of a jurisprudential
theory that hopes to connect the meaning of the text to lawful
. 12
auth onty:
L. REV. 411, 417 (2013) ("We an~ searching for an empirical fact: what
information would these words on the page have conveyed to the reasonable speaker or
English in the relevant audience at the time or enactment?"); id. ("IH laving stressed that
the original public meaning is an empirically objective fact, I now acknowledge that the
New Originalism docs also make a normative claim, and it is this: the original meaning of
the text provides the law that legal dccisionmakers arc hound by or ought to follow.").
31. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 61-\
lJ. CHI. L. REV. 101, 105 (2001) ("'IOiriginal meaning' refers to the meaning a reasonable
speaker or English would have attached to the words, phrases, sentences. etc. at the time
the particular provision was adopted."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text,
FoRm-JAM

and Nothing but the Text, So 1/elp Me God: Un-Writing Amar's Unwritten Constitution, XI
U. Ci11. L. REV. 131-15, 1440 (2014) ("ITihc true, original public meaning or the language
employed ... jisl the objective meaning the words would have had, in historical, linguistic,
and political context, to a reasonable, informed speaker and reader or the English language
at the time that they were adopted.").
32. Gary Lawson has been perhaps the most explicit about this point. See Gary
Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal J:nterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 41-1
(2006) ("IWihcn interpreting the Constitution, the touchstone is not the specific thoughts
in the heads of any particular historical people-whether drafters, ratit'icrs, or
commentators, however distinguished and significant within the drafting and ratification

2016]

ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING

83

This theory of original public meaning filters and
reconfigures the past because it is designed to produce a legal
meaning that lawyers living today might actually use. If, as
originalists believe, original meaning should be binding on later
generations, it cannot be plural and diverse. It must be unitary, or
at the very least, significantly bounded. A test of original public
meaning that regularly produced a plethora of original public
meanings for every important controversy before the courts
would be far less useful to lawyers today. Many originalists hope
to use their theory of interpretation to constrain judges- but a
theory that regularly generated multiple original public meanings
would simply not do the trick.
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport's theory of original
legal methods offers another good example. They argue that we
should determine the meaning of the Constitution by using the
interpretive rules and methods that well-trained lawyers would
have deemed applicable to the Constitution at the time of
adoption. 33 Their theory imposes several different frames and
filters on history. First, it focuses on the views of lawyers, not
citizens. 34 Second, it assumes the existence of- and therefore
looks for-a consensus, both about legal methods for
interpretation at the time of the Founding, and about how those

process they may have hccn- hut rather the hypothetical understandings of a reasonable
person who is artificially constructed hy lawyers. The thoughts of historical figures may he
relevant to the ultimate inquiry, hut the ultimate inquiry is legal."); see also (iary Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, XX VA. L. REV. 327, 3l}X (2002). Lawson argues:
[S[tatutcs of early Congresses arc at hcst weak cvidcncc of original meaning.
Originalist analysis, at least as practiced hy most contemporary originalists, is not
a search for concrete historical understandings held hy specific persons. Rather,
it is a hypothetical inquiry that asks how a fully informed public audience,
knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution and the surrounding
world, would understand a particular provision. Actual historical understandings
arc, of course, relevant to that inquiry, hut they do not conclude or define the
inquiry-nor arc they even necessarily the hcst available evidence. Enactments
of early Congresses arc particularly suspect because members of Congrcss, even
those who participated in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, arc not
disinterested observers. They arc political actors, responding to political as well
as legal influences, who arc eminently capable of making mistakes about the
meaning of the Constitution. Their work product constitutes post-enactment
legislative history that ranks fairly low down on the hierarchy of reliable evidence
concerning original meaning. Accordingly, whatever cvidcncc can he gleaned
from early statutes-and there is evidence in hoth directions-is minimally
relevant.
!d. at 3YX.
33.
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 23, at I IX.
34. !d. at 126.
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original legal methods would have been applied (hypothetically)
35
by well-trained lawyers to particular questions.
This theory of original meaning is connected to a larger
theory of why judges should be originalists. l\1cGinnis and
Rappaport believe that originalism is the best theory of
36
interpretation hecause it produces the best consequences. It
produces the best consequences because constitutional provisions
must be ratified by supermajorities, and McGinnis and Rappaport
argue, for various reasons, that supermajorities tend to produce
37
rules that will produce the best consequences over time. But in
order to enjoy the benefits of supermajority rules, the rules must
have determinate content and not be subject to what McGinnis
and Rappaport call "judicial updating." 31l They bellieve that once
we take original legal methods into account it is very unlikely that
most constitutional provisions will turn out to be vague. That is
because "citizens are risk-averse when it comes to constitutional
provisions" 3 and would not likely agree to adopt abstract or
vague provisions that would delegate responsibility for
implementation to later generations. "[W]hat supermajority rules
encourage are not broad delegations to the future, but
determinate principles about which there is a broad consensus." 40
For this reason, they argue that once we apply the appropriate
original legal methods, there is very little about the Bill of Rights
l)

35. !d. at 12X-2<J.
3A.
/d. at 19.
37. !d. at 33, X1-X5. To he sure, this assumes that the Constitution was ratified hy a
supcrmajority of We the People. In 17X7, women (among others) could not vote and
African-Americans were held in slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment poses other
prohlcms: it was proposed hy Congress only after Southern Representatives and Senators
were excluded so that Northern Rcpuhlicans could secure a two-thirds majority for an
amendment. Southern states were not readmitted to the Union until they agreed to ratify
the proposed amendment. McGinnis and Rappaport, however, maintain that the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment was a lawful and appropriate supcrmajurity decision. /d. at
70-71. They further argue that the Reconstruction Amendments and the Nineteenth
Amendment cured any potential prohlcms for their theory. These amendments, they
contend, provide the Constitution with all of the provisions that African Americans and
women would have ohtaincd if they had participated fully in the ratification of the
Constitution in 17X<J. /d. at 107-0X. 111-12.
3X.
/d. at X5.
39. !d. at 14<J.
40.
/d. This echoes Justice Scalia's assertion in District of Columbia v. 1/eller, 554
U.S. 570, 604-05 (200X), that there is no reason to hclicvc "that different people of the
founding period had vastly different conceptions of the right to keep and hear arms. That
simply docs not comport with our longstanding view that the Bill of Rights codified
vcncrahlc, widely understood lihcrtics."
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that is vague or requires constitutional construction because these
amendments "did not focus on deeply contested matters. " 41
McGinnis and Rappaport's theory of interpretation thus
depends on an account of original legal methods that is likely to
generate the kind of determinate content that will, in turn,
produce the admirable benefits of supermajority rules. Their
theory of how to interpret the Constitution, in other words, is
designed to mesh with their theory of why constitutions produced
through supermajority rules produce good results. 42 And it
depends on their assumption that when we go back in history
there will prove to be a consensus, both about original legal
methods at the time of adoption and about how well-trained
lawyers would have applied those original legal methods to the
constitutional text.
It may well be-and indeed I have argued-that this search
4
for consensus is illusory. J First, there was no general agreement
in 1787 that lawyers' views rather than the views of the general
public determined the legal meaning of the new Constitution. 44
Second, there was no consensus about the legal methods to be
45
used to interpret the new Constitution. Third, there is no reason
to think that lawyers-even hypothetical lawyers-would have
reached consensus on how to read the new Constitution, judging
from the constant disputes between well-trained lawyers about
virtually every important question that arose both before and
after ratification. Among well-trained lawyers, interpretive

41. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 2], at 14Y.
42. See id. at IIX (arguing that "the Constitution will produce the hendicial effects"
of supermajoritarian rules "only if it is given its original meaning," and that this "suggests
that the document should he interpreted using the original interpretive rules"'); id. at 15051 ("IJ]udicial discretion to resolve matters of construction is less likely to produce good
results than the supermajoritarian constitution-making process.").
43. LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2Y, at 353-56 & n.li-1; Jack Balkin, Nine
Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. i-115, X27-2X (2012).
44. See Saul Cornell, The People's Constitution vs. 7he Lawyers' Constitution:
Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Dehate over Originalism, 23 YALE J .L. &
HUMAN. 2Y5, 304 (2011 ); LARRY D. KRAMER, TilE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6-7 (2004). MDL&Q's history supports this
conclusion. They point out that the Dutch translation "suggests that at least some memhers
of the educated, founding-era puhlic might not have always recognized each of the legal or
specialized terms in the Constitution" and "failed ... to defer to a lawyer's interpretation."
MDL&O, supra note 6, at 52.
45. See Larry Kramer, Two (More) Prohlems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y Y07, Yl2-13 (200X); Calch Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 51Y, 555-56,561,571-73 (2003).
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controversies immediately broke out over the Jay Treaty, the First
46
Bank of the United States, and the Alien and Sedition Acts. The
dispute between the Federalists and Jeffersonians about what the
First Amendment meant seems to undermine McGinnis and
Rappaport's assurance that risk-averse citizens will only adopt
"determinate principles about which there IS a broad
47
consensus. "
If all that is so, then McGinnis and Rappaport's theory of
original methods originalism can't really get off the ground. But
even assuming that I am wrong about this and that the theory can
be made workable, what the theory offers is not a mere
description of original public meaning, but a carefully constructed
reconfiguration of the past that serves their larger theoretical
project.
McGinnis and Rappaport, like many other conservative
original meaning originalists, view constitutions primarily as
constraints on politics. I call this a skyscraper view of
4
constitutions. K In this model, the Constitution is like a more or
less finished building, and people engage in politics within its
structures. They can only change the building through the
supermajority rules of Article V amendment. By contrast, I view
constitutions as frameworks-they are a basic set of rules,
standards and principles that are designed to create institutions
4
and channel political action in order to make poliitics possible.
Constitutions are designed to put politics in motion and cause
people to solve their problems through politics as opposed to
through violence and civil war. But because constitutions are only
l)

46.
See JOSEPII M. LYNCII, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST
DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 6 (llJ9Y) (noting that in the early Congresses, disputes
over policy produced continual interpretive disagreements, with no consistency in
interpretive methods): RAY RAPHAEL, CONSTITUTIONAL MYTIIS: WHAT WE GET
WRONG AND How To CiET IT Rican 156-5X (2013) (listing interpretive controversies in
the first decade of the new Constitution).
47.
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 23, at 14Y; see also Jack Balkin, Nine
Perspectives on Living Originalism, supra note 43, at X35-3X (arguing that fundamental
disputes ahout the meaning of the First Amendment during the dehate over the Sedition
Act cast douht on McC I innis and Rappaport's assumptions).
4X.
See LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2Y, at 21-22.
4Y.
/d. at 21-25: see generally Jack M. Balkin, The Framework Model and
Constitutional Interpretation, in PHILOSOPIIICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (David Dyzcnhaus and Malcom Thorburn, cds.,) (forthcoming 2016 ),
http://papers.ssrn.com/s<>l3/papcrs.cfm?ahstract_id=2607105 !hercinalkr The Framework

Mode!J.
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frameworks, they need to be built out over time through
constitutional construction by both the judiciary and the political
branches.
For conservative originalists like McGinnis and Rappaport,
the Constitution is mostly finished, and we engage in ordinary
politics within its boundaries. For originalists like me, the
Constitution is never finished, and we continue to construct many
of its features through constitutional politics even as we live and
work within it. For originalists like McGinnis and Rappaport, the
constitution's legitimacy comes from its adoption and amendment
through supermajority rules. For originalists like me the
Constitution's legitimacy comes from two sources. The first is the
initial act of popular sovereignty; the second is from constitutional
constructions that respond, in the long run, to the forces of
democratic politics-including, but not limited to, successive
waves of democratic mobilization.
By now it should be clear that the way we construct our
concept of original public meaning has a lot to do with our
background assumptions about what constitutions are and how
they work. If you hold to the skyscraper view of constitutions, you
will be attracted to a relatively thick view of original public
meaning, because you assume (or you hope) that original meaning
can and will resolve a relatively high percentage of constitutional
questions. Accordingly, there will be relatively less need for
constitutional construction. In fact, McGinnis and Rappaport
take this point to its logical conclusion. They oppose the very idea
of constitutional construction. For them everything, or almost
everything, can be achieved through interpretation- that is,
interpreting original public meaning through original legal
methods. Once again we see how their model of original public
meaning coheres with their underlying political and theoretical
vision of what constitutions are and how they work.
Conversely, if you view the Constitution as a framework,
always unfinished, and always being built out through
constitutional construction, you will be more attracted to a thin
theory of original public meaning. A barebones account of
original public meaning makes the most sense given that the
democratic legitimacy of the Constitution, over time, depends on
more than the initial act of law-making. It also depends in part on
each generation's contribution to the constitutional project. The
initial framework guides and channels how those contributions
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may be made, hut it leaves a great deal to be worked out in the
future. A contrasting theory of original public meaning, in other
words, meshes well with a contrasting political and theoretical
vision of what constitutions are and how they work.
The nature of language alone will not tell us which version of
original public meaning we should choose. Instead, our view of
original public meaning-and therefore the way we will use
history to discover and expound that meaning- will depend on
deeper debates about the nature of constitutions and the sources
of their legitimacy.
McGinnis and Rappaport hopefully describe their historical
investigation as purely positive- that is, concerned only with the
facts of original meaning, and distinct from a normative theory of
interpretation. 50 But it is anything but that. Their account is a
carefully constructed version of original public meaning that fits
well- and is designed to fit well- with their larger normative
theory of what constitutions are for, why constitutions produce
good consequences, and how best to interpret them in order to
ensure that they do. Although McGinnis and Rappaport argue
that their positive theory of interpretation is separate from their
51
normative theory of constitutionalism, this really isn't the case.
52
The two are linked and each supports the other. Nor is this an
unusual example. It is how theories of original public meaning
work.
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF A THIN THEORY OF
ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING
I believe that originalists-and indeed, all constitutional
theorists-should be candid and self-conscious about the
relationships between how they use and investigate history and
their normative theories of constitutionalism and legitimacy. It
goes without saying that constitutional theorists should pursue
historical accuracy and make use of the best historical accounts.

50. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 23, at 117-1~ (arguing that original
methods originalism is a positive theory of what the Constitution means regardless of
whether this is normatively desirable.)
51. !d. at lin.
52. As they note. "lolur normative and positive theories converge because they arc
linked hy an insistence that both positive meaning and the nmmativcly desirable
interpretation arc generated by the interpretive rules obtaining at the time the
Constitution was enacted." !d.
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But legal theorists should also acknowledge how their theories of
constitutional law, filter, shape and configure the history they
look to and the ways that they employ history.
In my own work, I have tried, as best I can, to practice what
I preach. As noted above, my theory of constitutional
interpretation distinguishes between the task of constitutional
interpretation-ascertaining original public meaning-and
constitutional construction- building doctrines and institutions
that give effect to the Constitution's provisions. 53 With respect to
constitutional interpretation, I have argued for a thin theory of
original public meaning. This theory focuses on only a selection
of all of the various shades of meaning and understanding that
circulated during the adoption of the Constitution and its
amendments. That does not, mean, however, that I regard all of
these other meanings and understandings as irrelevant. Far from
it. They are important, if not crucial, to another task- the task of
constitutional construction. Historical evidence that is less
important to a thin version of original public meaning may be very
important in deciding how best to create doctrines and practices
to build out the Constitution over time.
Note, moreover, that a thin theory of original meaning does
not purport to reflect the actual experience of people
participating in ratification debates. People in these debates do
not say to themselves, "now I am engaged in arguing about
semantic meaning and now I am engaged in constitutional
construction." Nor, for that matter do most lawyers arguing about
the Constitution today. The work of interpretation and
construction is seamless. Rather, the distinction is one that is
54
imposed on events in hindsight.
My approach features both a thin theory of original public
meaning and a division of labor between interpretation and
construction. This constitutional theory shapes how I use history
in constitutional argument; conversely, my understanding of how
history works shapes my constitutional theory.
In previous work, I have defended a thin theory of original

53. See LIVING 0RIGINALISM, supra notl: 2Y. at 4-5: see also Lawrl:nCl: B. Solum,
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, X2 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 455 56 (2013).
54. Scl: Solum, supra note 53, at 4lJ5-lJl) (l:xplaining that thl: logical distinction
hetwecn interpretation and construction nl:ed not correspond to the expl:rience
dl:cisionmakcrs).

or
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meaning explicitly in terms of constitutional theory. For example,
I have argued that a thin theory of original meaning is most
consistent with how written constitutions work and what they are
for. 55 A constitution is an intergenerational project of governance
that seeks to preserve a decent politics but is never fully
completed. sc, I have also argued that, when contrasted to thicker
accounts of original meaning, a thin theory best preserves the
57
democratic legitimacy of the Constitution over timle.
Let me offer two additional reasons for adopting a thin
theory of original public meaning. Both concern the way that
constitutional theory uses history.
First, a thin theory is justified because during periods of
constitutional adoption and amendment we are likely to find a
variety of different views circulating, along with an almost
complete lack of attention to many questions that turn out to be
important to later generations. On many issues, including both
issues that people paid little attention to as well as issues about
which people cared the most, a consensus about constitutional
meaning is likely to be an illusion. (Here I use "m1eaning" in the
broadest sense- not in the narrow sense employed by the thin
theory.) With respect to these questions, it is misleading to assume
that there would be a single view held by all reasonable persons,
even hypothetical reasonable persons. And if we construct our
hypothetical individual to so as to create consensus where there is
none, we do both ourselves and the past a disservice.
No theory of original public meaning, I think, can ever fully
eliminate this problem. MDL&Q show how the problem will pop

55.
Must We He Faithful to Original Meaning?, supra note 2X, at 57,71 (arguing that
the thin theory follows from the framework model of constitutions); 77-XO (arguing that
the thin theory is necessary for democratic legitimation over time); see also Andrei
Marmor, Meaning and Helief in Constitutional Interpretation, X2 FORDHAM L. REV. 577,
503-% (2013) (explaining that how we should interpret constitutions depends on what we
think constitutions arc and what they arc for.). C.f John Danaher, The Normativity of
Linguistic Originalism: A Speech Act Analysis, 34 L. & PHIL. 3<)7, 42X-31 (2015) (arguing
that even the most hasic assumptions ahout constitutional interpretation depend on
normative views ahout the nature of constitutional speech acts.).
5o. See The Framework Model, supra note 40, at 4.
57.
Must We fle Faithful to Original Meaning?, supra note 2X, at 77-XO (arguing that
the "constitutional constructions of successive generations give the Constitution its
continuing democratic legitimacy," that "the efforts of successive generations arc
necessary to compensate for the limited institutional capacity of any single generation,"
and that a thick theory of original meaning "will cxacerhatc the democratic deficit of a
long-lived constitution. and ... will undermine democratic legitimacy as time goes on").
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up even within a thin theory of original meaning. Nevertheless, a
thin theory of original public meaning deals best with the
problems of dissensus and differing understandings among the
ratifying public, as well as the many kinds of questions that the
adopting public never considered or even imagined. A thin theory
works best because it deliberately focuses on those aspects of
constitutional meaning that are most likely to be widely shared
among the general public. Like all versions of original public
meaning, it is a selective reconstruction of original meaning,
motivated by practical and theoretical concerns.
Professional historians are particularly sensitive to the ways
that the present reconstructs the past for its own purposes. For
that reason, they are sometimes critical of lawyers' concepts of
original public meaning. Jack Rakove, for example, has criticized
original public meaning as an appeal to the views of imaginary
people who never existed. sH He points out that the framers
themselves understood that understandings of texts are rarely
unitary, and that people's views about what terms mean are likely
to evolve in the heat of political confrontation. 59 Participants in
constitutional debates will differ not only as to party and ideology,
60
but also class, education, experience, skill, and interest.
Moreover, their understandings emerge from a complex history
of readings and counter-readings, traditions and countertraditions, goals and motivations, which reach backwards
61
indefinitely into the past. What original public meaning offers us,
Rakove argues, is but a pale copy of that rich historical texture.
I take these critiques to heart. In fact, they are an important
motivation for a thin theory. The thicker we make our accounts
of original public meaning, and the more that we demand of it to
resolve contested questions in the present, the more disagreement
and the more variations of understanding we will discover among
the actual populations that ratified the Constitution and its
amendments. (And we may also discover that there was no
5X. Rakove, supra note 27, at 5X6; see also Cornell, supra note 27, at 405 ("Given the
contentious nature of Founding era legal culture it seems unreasonahlc to assume that one
can identify a single set of assumptions and practices from which to construct an ideal
reasonahlc reader who could serve as model for how to understand the Constitution in
17XX.").
5lJ. Rakove, supra note 27, at 5lJ3.
60. Cornell, supra note 27, at 405.
61. See Rakove, supra note 27, at 5Xl-X2 (descrihing the multiplicity of sources that
influenced dehates over the framing).
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consideration of certain issues at all.) We may hope to discover
what a reasonable person would have understood the
constitutional text to mean. But in any age or era-as in our
own- reasonable people often differ about many things,
especially where politics is involved.
If, undaunted, we nevertheless insist on a thick version of
original meaning, we will discover that we will only be able to
draw out a single answer from the past by reading the evidence
selectively and opportunistically, by ignoring many participants in
the ratification process, or by declaring that their views were not
in fact reasonable. Or we may have to make contes1table analogies
to deal with situations and contexts never considered or imagined.
Insisting on a unitary and thick account of original public meaning
under these conditions is an invitation to anachronism, special
pleading and the worst sort of "law office history."
This brings me to my second reason for employing a thin
theory of original public meaning. A thin theory does not assume
that an inquiry into original meaning exhausts all of the different
ways that history might be useful to law. It does not disdain the
serious enterprise of intellectual, political, and social history as
developed by professional historians. Quite the contrary: this
approach embraces all of history as a resource for construction.
Original public meaning gives us but the bare bones. For fleshing
out the Constitution, and making it work in practice, we require
far more nourishment.
Arguments about constitutional meaning and principle
emerge in the context of a particular time; it is often difficultand controversial- to decide how apply those debates and
concerns to the constitutional issues of our day. Simply put, the
generations who adopted the Constitution were trying to grapple
with their problems in their world, not our problems in our world.
The inherent indeterminacy of translating their concerns into our
world is a genuine problem if we must treat history as imposing
binding commands on the present. But those problems are greatly
lessened-and in fact, may become positive virtues-when we
confront them in the context of constitutional construction.
Constitutional construction is a matter of judgment; it uses all
available modalities of argument as sources of wisdom or insight
about how to continue the constitutional enterprise i[n the present.
The pursuit of constitutional fidelity through translation, as
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62

Lawrence Lessig likes to call it, is the work of constitutional
construction. And it is precisely the terrain in which history can
be most helpful.
But, you may object, isn't history also relevant to even a thin
account of original public meaning? Surely it is. But by scaling
down our ambitions, we can have far greater hope that history will
converge on a relatively small range of original public meanings.
If we ask for more, by contrast, we are far more likely to
encounter divergence and disagreement. These issues are best left
to constitutional construction.
Thus, the division of labor between interpretation and
construction is deliberate. Most inquiries about the legal
relevance of history will turn out to be questions of constitutional
construction because they touch on aspects of history that are
likely to be- as professional historians remind us- the most
complicated and complex. Far from excluding these complications
from constitutional argument, the thin theory embraces what is
rich and diverse as a resource for the present.
In the narrower task of constitutional interpretation,
discovering a multiplicity of original public meanings is usually a
problem. In the task of constitutional construction, however, it is
not. In constitutional construction, we are permitted, even
encouraged, to favor some opinions over others-even minority
opinions in their day- and render judgments on the past. In the
practice of constitutional construction, we employ history not as a
command but as a resource. Hence we may be more willing-and
better able- to take sides in disagreements among constitutional
participants in the past, and to say that some constructions were
better than others, and more faithful to the Constitution rightly
understood. We can say forthrightly that we prefer Hamilton's
reading of the spending power to Madison's, or vice-versa. We
need not pretend that there was always a single correct answer to
this question-our job is to choose the best answer for us in our
own time. That is because the project of constitutional
construction is different than the project of ascertaining original
meaning. Constitutional construction employs the past as a
dialectical tradition of readings and counter-readings that might
help us understand how to continue the constitutional enterprise
in the present. Constitutional construction views the past as a
112.

See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. RLV. 11 11). 117Y (1 YY3).
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resource that we draw on in the present to forge a narrative
connection between ourselves and the best and rnost admirable
parts of our political traditions as we now understand them.
Take, for example, the question of the original public
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sorne originalists,
taunted by generations of non-originalist critics, have tried to
63
show that originalism can explain Brown v. Board of Education
and Loving v. Virginia. M They have sought to demonstrate that
the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment actually
sought to ban segregated public schools and outlaw restrictions on
interracial marriage. There is evidence that some Republicans did
believe that this was the best interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1'5 But many more people who participated in the
ratification process did not; and had supporters made clear that
integrated public schools and racial intermarriage were the legal
consequence of ratifying the Fourteenth Amendnnent, it is very
unlikely that the amendment would have been adopted.(>(>
The difficulty arises from the way that originalists have
framed the task before them. Originalists would like to show that
the results in Brown and Loving were part of the original public
meaning of the document, and therefore binding on all future
generations. If this is the goal, I do not think that they can succeed,
at least as I read the history. Reasonable people reading the text
at the time of adoption would have disagreed on precisely these
issues. Nevertheless, once we are engaged in constitutional
construction, this same evidence is both useful and powerful in a

63.
See Michad W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, Xt VA.
L. REV. tJ47 (ltJtJ5); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A
Reply to Professor Klarman, XI VA. L. REV. ltJ37 (ltJtJ5).
64. See David R. Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 42 HASTINGS CON. L. REV. Q. 213 (2015).
65.
On congressional Rcpuhlicans' attitudes concerning desegregation of puhlic
schools, sec McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, supra note 63; on
the views of Rcpuhlicans ahout interracial marriage, sec PETER W ALLC:NSTEIN, TELL THE
COURT I LOVE MY WIFE: RACL, MARRIAGE, AND LAW-AN AMERICAN HISTORY
(2002); Upham, supra note 64.
66.
See McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown, supra note 63, at I tJ3X~
3tJ (arguing that integrated schooling was deeply unpopular at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, hut that the Amendment was pushed through "with little regard
for puhlic opinion"); see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional
Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, XI Va. L. Rev. lXXI, IXX5~tJ4 (1tJtJ5);
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EOliALITY 25~26, 146 (2004) ("the original understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment plainly permitted school segregation").
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different way. It shows us that, from the outset, there were
supporters of the Amendment who read it in a broadly egalitarian
way. That fact is especially important: For if there was no
consensus in favor of integrated schools and a right to racial
intermarriage, there was also no consensus against these results
either.
When we develop our doctrines of the Fourteenth
Amendment today, we can and should be proud to point for
authority to these early, far-sighted Republicans, and to their
belief in racial equality. We should be happy to argue that these
people correctly understood the Constitution, and not their
contemporaries-perhaps far more numerous-who insisted on a
more limited construction. When we do this, however, we follow
the example of these early Republicans not because we are
required to by a permanently fixed original public meaning, but
because we choose to, given our present-day understanding of
what is most faithful to the Constitution and its purposes. We
honor them because we think that they were right.
This difference in framing the problem is quite important. It
recognizes that the past takes on new meaning to us as we proceed
through history and that what we want from history changes as
our political circumstances change. The reason why contemporary
originalists want to show that Brown and Loving were always
correct is the intervening history of the Civil Rights Revolution,
which transformed Americans' understanding of constitutional
equality and constitutional justice. As a result, today the
legitimacy of constitutional theories depends on these theories'
ability to explain Brown and Loving, and not the other way
around.
An earlier generation of originalists, like Alfred Avins and
Raoul Berger, felt no great urgency to demonstrate that Brown
and Loving had always been correct, 67 and that Plessy v. Ferguson
was "wrong the day it was decided. " 6x But later generations of

67. See Alfred Avins, De Facto and De lure School Segregation: Some Reflected
Light on the Fourteenth Amendment from the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 3X MISS. L. J. 17Y
(I %7); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT l3Y JUDICIARY: TilE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 117-33, 245 (I Y77); see generally Earl Maltz, Original ism and
the Desegregation Decisions-A Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CoNST. COMM. 223
(IY%).
oX. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD

174 (2011) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
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originalists did- because the world they lived in had changed, and
the conditions of political and constitutional legitimacy had
changed. By the 1980s, it became increasingly important to
reconcile originalism with Brown if not Loving. This led many
originalists, led notably by Robert Bork and Michael McConnell,
to rethink older assumptions about whether Brown could be
explained on originalist grounds. The fact that the vast majority
of originalists moved in this direction strongly suggests, by the
way, that the framework model of constitutions, with its dual
sources of democratic legitimacy, is the best account of how the
American Constitution actually works.
One should not assume that later originalist scholars were
being disingenuous in attempting to prove that Brown was an
originalist result. Originalists, like all other serious scholars, hope
to improve on the work of their precedessors, and to correct the
mistakes of previous generations. My point, however, is that what
constitutes "improvement" in originalist argument-and indeed,
legal argument generally- is not altogether independent of
changes in politics and public opinion. Originalist scholars are
part of the processes of living constitutionalism like everyone else.
The same point applies, with suitable modifications, to sex
equality, or the rights of gays and lesbians. As these results enter
the constitutional canon, alter the conditions of constitutional
legitimacy, and reconstruct constitutional common sense,
originalists will be increasingly motivated to prove to skeptical
audiences that these results, too, always followed from the
original public meaning of the text.
It is worth noting that Steven Calabresi has already begun
this project of originalist reclamation for sex equality and gay
rights. 70 But it is equally important to note that to do this,
Calabresi has adopted a comparatively "thin" version of original
public meaning-although not in all respects identical to my own.
In general, Calabresi argues that we should understand the
()l)

X33, X63 (llJ92) (joint opinion of Kt.:nncdy, O'Connor, and Souter, JJ.)).
69. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF TilE LAW XI-X3 ( ll)90); McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, supra note 63.
70. See Steven (i. Calahresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same Sex
Marriage
(Northwestern
Puhlic
Law
Research
Pape1
No.
14-51),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ahstract_id=250l)443; Steven Ci. Calahresi & J uti a
T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, l)() TEX. L. REV. I (2011 ).
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original public meaning of the constitutional text in terms of
general principles and purposes gleaned from history, and
understood at a fairly abstract level of generality. 71 He does not
feel bound by original expected applications, although he does not
ignore them. Rather, he argues that we should understand and
apply constitutional text and principles in light of the facts as we
understand them today, and not in terms of what the adopting
72
generation believed. Although he does not explain his views in
terms of the distinction between interpretation and construction,
his arguments have tended to converge with this approach in
practice.
It is no accident, I think, that Calabresi's recent work has
employed a relatively thin theory of original public meaning. If we
insist on a thick conception of original public meaning, the project
of shoring up the legitimacy of originalism becomes increasingly
fantastical as time goes on. But these obstacles are entirely
unnecessary if we adopt a thin theory of original meaning, accept
the basic distinction between interpretation and construction, and
recognize the different roles that history plays in each endeavor.

71. See, e.g., Steven G. Calahresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v.
Virginia, 2012 BYU L. REV. 13lJ3, 13l)X (2012) (rejecting original expected applications
and arguing that "it is the semantic original puhlic meaning of the enacted texts that should
govern"); id. at 1413 ("In the second sentence of Section 1 !of the Fourteenth
Amendment!, citizens arc protected from caste-or class-creating state laws, and all persons
are protected from arhitrary and capricious executive and judicial action and from the
failure of stale executives and judges to provide the equal protection of those laws already
on the hooks.").
72.
See, e.g., Calahresi & Rickert, supra note 70, at lJ-10 ("Sex discrimination,
although not generally understood to he a form of caste in I X6X, had come to he recognized
as a form of caste hy Jl)20, when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. The definition
of caste had not changed; rather, the capahilitics of women and the truth of their status in
society had come to he hetter understood and that new understanding was memorialized
in the text of the Constitution."). Calahresi and Rickert explain:
Did the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment understand sex
discrimination to he a form of caste or of special-interest class legislation?
Certainly not. But then they also did not understand when they enacted the Civil
Rights Act of IX66 hanning race discrimination in making contracts that they
were also hanning antimiscegenation laws, which made it a crime for a white
person to contract to marry a hlack person. The point is that sometimes legislators
misapply or misunderstand their own rules. For this reason, although the
Framers" original expected applications of the constitutional text are worth
knowing, they arc not the last word on the Fourteenth Amendment's reach. This
was recognized at the time, which is precisely why some legislators worried that
the Amendment would have unanticipated effects.
/d. at 7.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In this essay I have argued that the original public meaning is
not something that lawyers simply find in the past. Rather, it is a
theoretical construction that lawyers have made in order to do the
work of constitutional theory and engage in constitutional
interpretation. There is no single way to construct original public
meaning from the materials of the past. What we do construct
depends in part on what we think constitutions are for and how
they are supposed to work. It also depends on the practical needs
of lawyers in search of a distinctively legal meaning that they can
employ in legal argument.
I have also argued that a thin version of original public
meaning, coupled with a division of labor between interpretation
and construction, is the best approach. MDL&Q remind us,
however, that even a thin theory of original Ineaning is not
perfect. For one thing, it cannot forestall all problems of
disagreement among the ratifying public. In some cases, and on
some questions, there will simply be no single original public
meaning that we can treat as binding today. In those cases, the
best we can do is offer a theory that allows us to stipulate to an
original public meaning; or we can move directly to constitutional
construction. We should accept this lesson with grace and
humility. And we should remember-with openness and even
with delight-that the past always contains the ability to surprise
us, and reveal that what we thought was natural and obvious is far
more complicated and interesting than we had ever imagined.

